LEVENDARY CAFE January 12, 2022 postadmin Post in Uncategorized HARVARD I eustNESs I SC H OOL REV : FEBRUARY 26, 2013M•l·lli#f,Ji4WChristopher A. Bartlett and Arar HanCASE 7.1 LEVENDARY CAFE: THE CHINA CHALLENGEHBS Professor Christopher A. Bartlett and writer Arar Han prepared this case solely as a basis for class discussion and not as anendorsement, a source of primary data, or an illustration of effective or ineffective management. This case, though based on realevents, is fictionalized, and any resemblance to actual persons or entities is coincidental. There are some references to actualcompanies in the narration.Copyright © 2011 President and Fellows of Harvard College. To order copies or request permission to reproduce materials, call 1-800-545-7685, write Harvard Business Publishing, Boston, MA 02163, or go to http://www.hbsp.harvard.edu. This publication maynot be digitized, photocopied, or otherwise reproduced, posted, or transmitted, without the permission of Harvard Business School.Levendary Cafe was spun out from private equityownership in January 2011, and the followingmonth, Mia Foster was named as its new CEO. Thedeparting CEO, Howard Leventhal, was the belovedfounder ofthe popular chain of 3,500 cafes. He hadgrown a small Denver soup, salad, and sandwichrestaurant into a $10 billion business, but after32 years was moving on to new interests.This was Foster’s first job as CEO. Previously,the 47-year-old had been president of the U.S.business of a large American fast food companyfor seven years. She had started her career at amajor global accounting firm, leaving to earn anMBA from Wharton. Upon graduation, she hadbecome a consultant at McKinsey before taking ajob in product management at PEtG, where sheworked her way up the ranks. Foster was knownfor her frank communication style and strongexecution.In spite of the promise held by the Levendarybrand and Foster’s strong track record, Wall Streetwas cautious about the stock. While the company’sfundamentals were strong and its performancegenerally in line with management forecasts, itsshares traded at a discount to comparable restaurant stocks. There were two reasons for this. First,analysts were concerned that Levendary’s domestic business was nearly tapped out. Second, givenFoster’s lack of previous international management experience, they were skeptical of her abilityto build a multi-national brand.Foster felt challenged by Wall Street’s skepticism and wanted to address it head-on. In particular, she knew that Levendary’s recent entryinto the fast-growing China market would beclosely watched. So she was concerned by reportsthat recently opened China locations incorporated some dramatic departures from Levendary’sBuilding New Management CapabilitiesU.S. concept, particularly in store design andmenu selection. She was also frustrated by theapparent unwillingness of Louis Chen,Leventhal’s hand-picked president of LevendaryChina, to conform to the company’s planningand reporting processes. To address these concerns, Foster decided she needed to visit the Chinese operations.On May 25, 2011, Foster stepped out of thelimo that Chen had arranged to pick her up at theShanghai Pudong airport. Heading in to her firstin-person meeting with Chen, she knew therewere big decisions to be made. Indeed, theywould determine the future of Levendary China.The Multi-Unit Restaurant BusinessIn 2010, the U.S. restaurant and contract foodservice industry was a $600 billion industry with960,000 locations. 1 Multi-unit restaurant concepts represented approximately 300/o of theindustry by units, with independent operators asthe balance. The restaurant and foodserviceindustry was highly fragmented, and even industry giant McDonald’s generated just 20/o of totalrevenues.Multi-unit concepts were generally categorizedinto three industry segments:• Specialty Establishments like Starbucks, Dunkin’ Donuts, and Baskin-Robbins primarilyserved snacks and beverages under $5.• Quick Service Restaurants, or so-called “fastfood” concepts like McDonald’s, Taco Bell, andWendy’s, provided counter or drive-throughservice with average tickets between $4 and$10.• Casual Dining included brands like OliveGarden, Applebee’s, and Outback, and offeredtable service for dinner entrees priced between$8 and $20. Within this group, fme diningconcepts like Ruth’s Chris and Capital Grillefeatured entrees into the $40 range.While some concepts had bridged these categories for years (e.g., Friendly’s offered casual1 “Freedonia Focus on Restaurants,” Freedonia Group.February 20 11.dining coupled with a strong takeaway ice creambusiness), more recently several concepts hadclustered around an emerging category oftencalled “Quick Casual.” For example, PandaExpress was a quick service format of Chinesecasual dining, while Chipotle offered a quickcasual Mexican-American dining experience.Like other quick casual restaurants, Levendarypromised more wholesome choices than its quickservice cousins and a more informal self-servedining experience than its casual dining relatives.Quick casual restaurants typically had averagechecks in the $8 to $12 range.Restaurant Cost StructureRestaurants had relatively simple cost structureswhich one industry expert defmed as follows: 2• Occupancy: These costs included real estaterental, common area maintenance, and energyand waste disposal. In the United States, theyhovered around 100/o of revenues.• Labor: Even at minimum wage, labor was typically the largest cost element. High turnover inthe industry required restaurant companies tocontinually source and train new employeesand to manage employee attrition. Labor typically represented 250/o to 350/o of total revenues.• Food: Food costs accounted for 280/o to 320/o.This expense was influenced by not only thecost of the ingredients purchased, but also theamount of waste.• Supply: About 10/o to 40/o of revenues typicallywent to paper products at quick service restaurants or to linen and uniform deaning athigher-end casual dining restaurants.In a best case scenario, a restaurant mightmake up to 350/o gross margin, but 200/o to 250/owas more typical. Franchised restaurants alsopaid a royalty, adding a 30/o to 60/o cost line, anda marketing fee which added a further 20/o to I00/oin costs. Depending on the size of the franchiseorganization, overhead might account foranother 50/o to 150/o of cost.2 http://www.bakertilly.com/userf1les/BT_Retail_RestaurantBenchmarks_web_small.pdf.Case 7.1 Levendary Cafe: The China Challenge 427Exhibit 1 Levendary Organizational ChartMia FosterCEOEVP, AdministrationPeter Steele Lucien LeclercVP, Business Dev.Nick WhiteChief Franchise Officer Chief Concept Officer Chief Operating OfficerIVP, Fin/Acctg SVP, MarketingVP, Legal Director, CreativeVP, Real Estate Director, DistributionVP, IS Director, OnlineVP, PurchasingRestaurants typically operated on razor-thinmargins, with profitability a direct function oftheir ability to generate high traffic, executeconsistently, and control costs. Traffic, in turn,was a function of the brand’s appeal, marketingeffectiveness, real estate location, and storeexperience.Levendary Cafe: The FoundationsIn the quick casual restaurant segment, Levendary Cafe was distinguished by two elements:wholesome soups, salads, and sandwiches usinghigh-quality ingredients, and a commitment toservice in a comfortable, friendly environment.Its corporate chefs were highly trained artisansfrom the Culinary Institute of America andother top cooking schools who took pride increating everyday versions of gourmet fare.Customers raved, “Eating at Levendary makesme feel rich.”Levendary was also distinguished by itswillingness to take risks, especially those thathelped evolve its concept over time. It was anSVP, FoodRegional VPs,US MarketLouis ChenVP, ChinaDirector, Ops, Tools &LearningDirector, Cateringentrepreneurial characteristic traced to founderHoward Leventhal. The most recent risky changeoccurred five years before Foster became CEO,when the company decided to use only organicgrains in its breads and hormone-free naturallyraised meats in its sandwiches. To management’sdelight, customers willingly paid the premiumprice, resulting in increased revenues andmargins and a simultaneous boost in customertrust in the brand.The Organizational Foundation: BlendingConcepts and OperationsA complex organization supported Levendary’sprimarily U.S. business. The Denver headquartershoused the following activities (see Exhibit 1 fora basic organizational chart):• Concept: For 23 years, Howard Leventhal hadrelied on Chief Concept Officer (CCO) LucianLeclerc to keep Levendary a top U.S. restaurantconcept. Leclerc managed both the food development group and the marketing team thattogether determined what LevendaryBuilding New Management Capabilitiesrepresented to the customer. With Leclerc’suncanny ability to sense nascent food trendsand Leventhal’s willingness to take calculatedrisks, the pair had kept the company at theforefront of changing tastes. Their shared commitment to healthful, wholesome eating wasembedded in the company’s culture andreflected in its well-known advertising slogan“Tasty Fresh Goodness” or TFG as insidersreferred to it.• Marketing: The Marketing group reported tothe CCO. Its creative team worked with outsideadvertising agencies to convey the TFG concept through advertising copy and images. Thelogo, store decor, and media images used apalette of earth tones to communicate natural,wholesome goodness. The distribution teamensured that banners, table tents, windowdecals, and menu boards were properly placedin all 3,500 company and franchised stores,appropriately modified for differences in storesize and layout. Preparing menus and menuboards was complicated by variations in menuitems to respond to local market preferencesand by pricing differences to meet local competition. But the comfortable, welcoming, andhomey “look and feel” of stores alwaysremained consistent.• Food: A fully scaled test kitchen and foodscience laboratory also reported to the CCO,taking the items developed by the CCO’sexecutive chefs and making the adaptationsnecessary to supply their components withquality and consistency to each of Levendary’3,500 cafes. The food team was also responsible for conducting quality checks in the field.• Operations: Led by Chief Operating Officer(COO) Nick White, who had 30 years of operating experience in U.S. franchised restaurantcompanies, this group managed the day-today restaurant business. Store managers atthe 1,200 company-owned cafes reported todistrict managers, who in turn reported in toarea directors, then market vice presidents.This structure allowed tight control of storelevel expenses and close monitoring of operations against the company’s detailed andstrict operating standards, policies, andpractices. It also relayed any recommendationsfor modifications to the menu or variations inthe store “look and feel” to the Concept groupfor consideration and approval.Operations was also responsible for Operating Tools and Learning (OIL). As retailemployees were often high school-aged orminimally educated, OIL set operating standards and provided materials to enhanceemployees’ learning. Acting as a bridgebetween the Concept team and the stores,OIL also developed the training materials andprocesses to break down food preparation intosteps that ensured quality local delivery of thechefs’ gourmet creations. In general, OIL functioned as both an internal school and a standards enforcer.• Franchise: About two-thirds of Levendary’s3,500 stores were franchised. Headed by ChiefFranchise Officer Peter Steele, the franchiseteam recruited new franchisees, supportedexisting franchisees, and enforced brand andoperating standards in franchised stores.• Business Development: Staffed by formerstrategy consultants, this department sourcednew revenue opportunities such as Levendarybranded grocery items like coffee, cold cuts,and soups. This group also led research forthe company’s nascent international expansion and was responsible for an experimentallicensing deal in Dubai. Launched in 2009,this opportunistic venture was run by a SaudiArabian restaurant company owned by anold friend of Leventhal’s. Aside from China,Dubai was Levendary’s only internationaloperation.• Administrative Staff Groups: Real estate,fmance and accounting, legal, purchasing, andinformation systems all reported to an Executive Vice President (EVP) of Administration.Headquarters staff totaled approximately 300 inall. There was no separate international division.The Strategic Base: Serving the U.S. MarketLevendary was built on a culture that emphasized“delighting the customer.” As founder, HowardLeventhal was fond of telling store staff, “ForgetCase 7.1 Levendary Cafe: The China Challenge 429Exhibit 2Levendary Income Statement 2010 (dollars in 000s)RevenuesSalesRoyaltiesIngredient & paper good sales to franchiseesTotalCosts and ExpensesFood & PaperLaborOccupancyTotalFood and paper good inventoryDepreciation and amortizationG&AMarketingPre-opening expensesTotal costs and expensesOperating profitInterest expenseOther expenseIncome before taxIncome taxNet incometoday’s profit. Have a positive impact on customers’ lives. Make them want to come back. That’show we’ll win in the long run.” Day-to-day, thisphilosophy translated into a personalizedapproach that would accommodate customerrequests such as removing sprouts from a sandwich or serving a soup extra hot. Such serviceappealed to Levendary’s customer base of whitecollar professionals and upper-middle-classwomen. “Heavy user” customers in these groupsvisited Levendary five or six times a week.But this approach taxed Levendary’s store-leveloperations. The two key store operating metrics ofspeed of service and order accuracy were driven bystandardization, and personalization threatenedboth. In response to store operators who questionedhis relentless drive to provide personal service,Year EndingDecember 31, 20109,248,134603,365945,92410,797,4232,623,7122,933,980706,7906,264,482776,902480,711710,4581,239,41329,9743,237,4581,295,4834,72529,6241,261,134480,571780,563Leventhal would simply point to the company’simpressive results. (See Exhibit 2.)Leventhal’s philosophy ofdelighting the customeralso translated into local menu adaptions. Withstores in urban, suburban, and rural environmentsacross all 50 states, Levendary believed there was nosuch thing as “the American consumer.” WhileMcDonald’s created one menu for its entire system,Levendary was more flexible. It offered fewer soupitems and more drink options in the South, allowedone or two regional specialties to be added to its coremenu, and listed its menu items in order of localpopularity. While appreciated by customers, themenu variations represented a challenge for theFood, Operations, and Marketing teams.To keep the brand fresh in the eyes of thecustomer, the company was also committed to430 Building New Management Capabilitiesevolving menu choices, typically by featuring intrend healthy ingredients like pomegranates orquinoa. The Concept team rolled out a suite ofnew products five times a year, often with minorvariants adapted to the South’s appetite for fattier, sweeter formulations, or the Northeast’s loveof turkey and cheddar cheese. Each new releasewas accompanied by a marketing program andnew menu boards.In truth, the new items boosted the company’simage more than its sales. Systemwide sales weredriven by a small number of core items. For 800/oof locations, those included such Levendary classics as its turkey and avocado sandwich withcranberry dressing, its award-winning cheesesoup, and its chicken Caesar salad. For the other200/o of outlets, the core sales drivers could be asdiverse as espresso beverages, Howard’s FamousCookies, or a local seasonal special.Expanding Abroad: China DreamsIn 2008, the company’s domestic growth wasslowing. Its geographic expansion strategy Qokingly referred to within the company as “follow themommies,” later adapted to “follow the yuppies”)had plateaued. Recognizing that its concept didnot translate well into small towns, particularlyin the Midwest and South, the board of directorsbegan discussions about overseas expansion. Atthe board’s urging, management instructed itsstrategy team to research opportunities in China,a market that had attracted a great deal of attention among U.S. restaurant companies.Opportunities in ChinaWith a population of 1.4 billion people andannual GDP growth of 14.50/o over the pastdecade, China was ripe for investment. Two additional trends attracted U.S. restaurants: China’surban population rose from 36.20/o of the total in2000 to 46.60/o in 2009, and a strong middle classemerged whose per capita income surged fromRMB 6,282 to RMB 17,175. (In 2010, RMB 1 =USD 0.15.)An affluent middle class, a large increase ofwomen in the workforce, and a growing lifestyletrend to eat out all supported growth in the Chinese food services industry, which increased fromRMB 1.106 trillion in 2004 to RMB 1.996 trillionfive years later. Independent full-service restaurants still dominated the industry (there were2,723,000 nationally), but the highly competitivequick service sector was growing the fastest, fromRMB 254 billion in 2004 to RMB 471 billionin 2009.While foreign fast food companies attracted themost attention, restaurants serving Asian food,primarily Chinese, took the biggest share of thequick service segment. These mostly independentrestaurants appealed to locals’ preference for ricebased dishes and low prices. However, due to lowmargins, wide variation in regional food tastes,and most of all, the difficulty independents hadexperienced in standardizing operations, therewere few successful local chains.The most successful foreign fast food chainwas KFC, which had more than 3,000 restaurantsin 450 Chinese cities. In 2010 KFC opened onaverage one new store every day. Through itsChinese joint venture partners and local management, it had learned to adapt. It added a fewitems such as congee rice porridge and evenaltered the famous seasoning on its core friedchicken offering.McDonald’s entered China in 1992, five yearsafter KFC, and by 20 JO operated 1,100 restaurants in 110 cities. Its restaurants retained a consistent worldwide look and feel, and a menufeaturing its Big Mac, McNuggets, and frenchfries. While its core menu was the same, localizedspecials such as the China Mac with black peppersauce, pork burgers, and red bean ice cream hadbeen added. Despite the fact that a plate of sixpork buns cost 25 cents at a Chinese street stall,McDonald still charged $2.50 for its large fries,appealing to Chinese youth’s willingness toindulge in foreign fare.Pizza Hut’s China strategy was notable for itsdeparture from its U.S. original. Its 560 outletswere positioned as high-end casual dining restaurants, and its menu extended well beyondpizza to include scallop croquettes and escargot.Wine was served, reservations were accepted, anda 45-minute wait for a table was not uncommon. Case 7.1 Levendary Cafe: The China Challenge431~– – – —Young affluent Chinese went to Pizza Hut tomarket position as a base for franchising outletsimpress their dates.throughout China, but apart from a requirementDespite these successes, many other Americanto “do right by the concept,” gave him broadrestaurants had struggled in China. When Applelatitude to execute.bee’s replanted itself in Shanghai, the conceptfizzled. So too did California Pizza Kitchen, forTo prepare for his assignment, Chen becamea rotational intern in each of the major depart cing the founders to personally intervene toments in Levendary’s Denver headquarters asrelaunch the effort. Many attributed PretzelTime’s failure in China to its white tile decor thatwell as in a handful of stores. Over six weeks,his mandate was to pick up as much as he couldreminded people of a bathroom.and replicate it in China. The Denver team invitedMore recently, Chinese chains had begun tohim to tap into their resources and expertise,learn from foreign competition and began tointerpreting and adapting them for use in thefocus on standardization and tight control oflocal Chinese stores. Before his departure forraw materials, food preparation, and in-store serChina, the board asked Chen about his plans. He vice. After overtaking McDonald’s as HongKong’s leading chain, Dar Jia Le (“Big HappyHouse”) took its tightly controlled operations toChina. Other successful Asian chains in Chinaincluded U.S.-listed Country Style Cooking(2009 Chinese sales of $495 million) servingSichuan food, Hong Kong-based Little Sheep($235 million} featuring Mongolian hot pot, andJapan’s Ajisen ($256 million) ramen shops. Leaping into Chinawith turkey, but they love chicken, so we’lladapt the menu, just as we do in the States. It After reviewing the research, Levendary’s boardand top management decided to enter China. Thedecision was hastened by the appearance of LouisChen as a viable candidate to lead the effort. Chen heard about Levendary’s interest in ChinaIn spite of the monumental work ahead, thethrough a Stanford MBA classmate who hadbecome a partner at the private equity firm thatboard was convinced that Chen was the rightchoice. The 34-year-old was bilingual in Englishhad owned the company prior to its 20 I 1 IPO.Chen gradually earned the confidence of CEOLeventhal and other key stakeholders. In time,and Mandarin Chinese, and his decade-longexperience as a retail property developer gavehim intimate familiarity with neighborhoods inLeventhal dropped his original idea of a jointShanghai and Beijing-a valuable asset given theventure with an established Chinese operator,and entrusted Levendary China to Chen, whosepowerful impact of store location on profitability.Chen also had a network of contacts to help speedenergy and entrepreneurial spirit reminded himup the process of permitting, incorporating, andof an earlier version of himself.staffmg stores. Finally, he was passionate aboutChen’s formal contract provided a two-yeargood food, and had long wanted to work in theterm starting in September 2009 with an optionfor annual renewal, but his relationship with thecompany was best described as a handshakerestaurant industry.Chen opened his first location in theexpatriate-heavy Pudong region of Shanghai in agreement. While Chen formally reported toLeventhal, the CEO managed him with a verylight touch. He asked Chen to establish a strongwas confident:It won’t be easy but others have succeededand we can too. I believe we have a goodchance of building a credible foundation ofstores and breaking even within a year. Wejust have to be flexible. For example, Chineseeat few dairy products, so we should downplay our cheese soup. But a new generationnow gives milk to its children, so tastes areevolving. And most people aren’t familiarmay take time, but I believe Levendary willconnect with Chinese youth, and that’s thefuture.January 2010, just three months after returningto China in his new role. Occupying the comerground floor location of a new high-rise officeBuilding New Management Capabilitiesbuilding, the first restaurant was both prominentand luxurious. It was an instant hit among whitecollar employees of the global financial firmshoused above it. Taking a page from Pizza Hut’sChina playbook, Chen positioned the new location as casual dining with table service andhigher prices than local fast food concepts. Butwith the real estate markets in Beijing andShanghai heating up, and KFC and McDonald’ssnapping up sites, Chen wanted to move fast. Hislocal knowledge and connections helped himlock in prime locations at good prices, and withina year, his initial location had grown into a chainof 23 restaurants.Expansion in China: Key DecisionsDuring her interview process, Foster heard muchabout the great hopes for Levendary China. However, she had not had the opportunity to meetChen or to closely examine the China business.When she became CEO in February 2011, the newCEO was surprised to fmd that the Chinese subsidiary submitted all management and fmancialreports to Denver in its own format. The frnancegroup then “massaged” them to apply U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP)and adapt them to Levendary’s internal monthlyreporting format. Foster felt strongly that thiswould not be a sustainable practice as the Chinaoperations grew into a larger portion of totalrevenue.The First Meeting: Raising the QuestionsIn considering her options for bringing the Chinareporting in line with the U.S., Foster favoredhiring an international fmancial analyst for theDenver frnance team, and thought Levendary’sauditor should also manage the China audit. Bothsteps were expensive but seemed necessary for apublicly traded company that intended to stakeits future on growth in the China market. Duringa video conference that Foster set up to meetChen in her first week at Levendary, she sharedthese thoughts with him. He bristled at her suggestions, claiming that both changes would notonly incur unnecessary costs but would alsogreatly inconvenience his local operations.Chen’s resistance struck Foster as either naYveor antagonistic, and she responded firmly:“You’re going to have to make a change, Louis.We have to protect the integrity of our reportingstructure.” “Fine,” Chen shot back. “But to operate here, we have to be compliant with local taxlaws or we’ll get shut down. If you need thosechanges, you’re going to have to spend themoney to set it up right.” Saying she wouldfollow up, Foster left the virtual meeting with anagging feeling that developing a productiverelationship with Chen was not going to be easy.The next day, Foster added the China operations as an agenda item in the weekly executivemeeting she held with her direct reports inDenver. The EVP of Administration agreed thatusing non-GAAP numbers from China in thefmancial reports was a risk, and that formalizingthe reporting process was a necessary change. Asthe discussion broadened, COO Nick White, theperson to whom Chen had reported sinceLeventhal’s departure, spoke up:I talk to Louis every week or two. I’m flooredby how quickly he got a couple dozen storesup and running. It’s an amazing achievement.But the reality is that no senior executive hasvisited China since Howard officiated at theopening ceremony for the Pudong store a yearago. I’m sure a lot has changed since then, butI haven’t been able to get Louis to give memuch. Howard gave Louis a lot of freedom toestablish the Chinese operations, and frankly,it shows. Louis is a great asset but I confessmanaging him bas been a frustrating exercise.By the end of the meeting, the executive teamhad agreed it was time to obtain more information about the China operations. Chief FranchiseOfficer Peter Steele agreed to conduct a comprehensive review of the 23 Levendary Cafes in thatmarket. White said he would advise Chen ofSteele’s plans, emphasizing that this was a routine process regularly undertaken in all franchised and licensed cafes in the U.S. market,and that Steele had recently completed such areview in Dubai.Steele spent 10 days in China, and at a weeklyexecutive meeting in late March, presented hisCase 7.1 Levendary Cafe: The China Challengefmdings. He provided detailed descriptions of the23 China locations, all in or around Beijing andShanghai. Chen had taken many liberties withthe look and feel of the cafes. While the firstlocation in Pudong largely conformt’d to Levendary’s design standards and menu selection, otherlocations held surpnsmg and sometimesalarming changes. For example, the second location, located in Shanghai’s historic Yu Gardenarea, was a takeaway counter with no seating.The third location, on Beijing’s embassy row, wassimilar to the first store in both design andoffering, but the fourth, at the north entrance toBeijing’s Forbidden City, not only had no saladson its menu, it replaced Levendary’s classicwooden framed upholstered chairs with a plasticframed alternative from a local furniture supplier.By the opening of the 23 rd location in a Koreanexpatriate-heavy suburb of Shanghai, all but onesandwich item had been removed from the menu,and replaced by a variety of local dumplings.Immediately after the meeting, an irate LucianLeclerc appeared in Foster’s office. She was notsurprised, given his visible agitation duringSteele’s presentation. “Plastic chairs and dumplings! This is a pure disaster,” he exploded.“What’s going on in China could destroy everything I’ve worked for over the past 23 years. Ourcustomers travel a lot, and in one visit to just oneof those places, our carefully nurtured conceptand image will be ruined. Mia, you need to stopLouis now.”After letting him vent, Foster reassured Leclercthat she would give the issue her full attention.She turned to examine a chart comparing severalLevendary locations in the United States andChina (Exhibit 3). Inwardly, she knew thatresolving this issue would be a big test for her.Meeting Two: Confronting the IssuesIn early April, Foster sent Chen a copy of Steele’sfindings in advance of a second video conferenceto which she also invited White. Foster openedthe discussion by explaining that China was critical to Levendary’s growth, so she wanted to beinvolved in discussions about its plans. Sheexplained how concerned she and White hadbeen about Steele’s report. Chen’s responsesounded angry:I don’t think you guys appreciate the difficultyof managing a business in this environment.We’ve worked like crazy this past year andhalf. And in a tough market with minimumsupport from Denver, we’ve built a businessthat works in China. But now that we’veopened 23 locations in just over a year andare about to turn a profit, you want me tochange everything? Why would you do that?Levendary as it exists in the U.S. simply willnot work in China. Have you seen Denny’s inJapan? It’s wildly successful but it serves tonkatsu [a Japanese breaded and fried porkcutlet] and ramen. They understand thatnobody wants pancakes and BLTs in Tokyo.People want the food they know but with coolAmerican branding.The only places where we can do whatLevendary does in the U.S. are Pudong andBeijing’s embassy row. Those locations are upand running using the American model.Everywhere else, we have to adapt our storedesign and menu. Otherwise, we won’t beprofitable. I think our performance speaks foritself (Exhibit 4).Having reviewed the research, Foster waskeenly aware of the difficulties of localizing achain restaurant concept in a foreign marketand the major tradeoffs entailed. She was awarethat the Japanese company operating Denny’sJapan had great success by radically changingits entire menu while keeping the stores’ lookand feel. But she also knew that the McDonald’sapproach was much more standardized worldwide. A McDonald’s in Shanghai varied fromone in New York City only in local marketingpractices and some limited menu deletions andinsertions. Indeed, Foster had been amazed tolearn that McDonald’s had even imported bricksto new markets it entered in Eastern Europe sothat its restaurants would be as consistent aspossible to its U.S. standards.These were two opposite approaches, andFoster was not sure either model was appropriateBuilding New Management CapabilitiesExhibit 3Comparison of Two Levendary U.S. and Two Levendary China LocationsAnnualized 2010sales (USD)Square footageSeatsStaff (full-timeequivalent)Average traffic(guests perday)Average checkMetroU.S./ NYC$10,320,0002,50084243,210$15SuburbanU.S./ DenverArea$2,126,0004,00012026560$12Metro Metro-suburbChina/ Beijing China/ ShanghaiEmbassy Koreatown$806,000 $288,0001,500 50080 0 (counter only)20 13260 430$10 $2(USD)Top 5 menuitemsTurkey sand. Denver Melt sand. Chicken soup Chicken dumplingCheese soup Cheese soup Chicken sand. Pork dumplingSalmon salad Turkey sand. Roast beef sand. Chicken sand.Chicken sand. Caesar salad BBQ chicken sand. BBQ chickenCaesar salad Howard’s cookie Thai veggie soup sand. Pu-erh teaOutdoor seating?Personalizedservice?Free WiFi?YesYes YesYes Yesfor Levendary. She had yet to be convinced byChen’s assertion that growth in China requiredthat the stores and menus be as different as theyhad become, and responded carefully:Louis, I think Peter’s report gives us a goodstarting point to think about that issue goingforward. You’ve provided us a great platformfor our future growth in China. Now it’s timefor us to think through how we want to dothat. The home office will probably need tostep up and do more to support you. We’ll alsohave to ensure the Levendary orand is positioned for growth, and that will require someconsistency across borders. Nick and I willboth commit to working with you to supportyour efforts. But we first need to fully understand your strategic plan for growth in China.Yes(simplified tableservice)YesA more conciliatory-sounding Chen responded:Mia, you speak from a place of ideas, bestpractices, and compliance. But I’m here inthe trenches running 23 restaurants that I’vebuilt one by one by reading market needs andsensing opportunities. I’m proud of Levendary’s presence here. When you send in headquarters analysts and start telling me thingsneed to change, I don’t think you have a goodsense of what it took to get us to where we are.You asked me about my strategic plan. WellI don’t have one. And frankly, if I’d had one,I don’t think we would have grown so quicklybecause we wouldn’t have been as nimble orresponded as flexibly to market needs. I’mwilling to work with you to make somechanges. But understand that I was given freeCase 7.1 Levendary Cafe: The China Challenge 435Exhibit 4Levendary China Income Statement (2010)Sales (US$)Costs and ExpensesFood & PaperLaborOccupancyTotalDepreciation and amortizationG&AMarketingPre-opening expensesTotal costs and expensesOperating profitInterest expenseOther expenseIncome before taxIncome taxNet incomerein for 18 months. If you start putting in newcontrols and tying local operations to thehome office, I can’t be held responsible ifgrowth slows. If you make changes, we’ll needto be very clear about what I’m responsiblefor, and what can I expect from Denver.Foster found herself annoyed at what shesensed to be Chen’s continued resistance andnegative attitude. But there was no time for thatnow. Thoughts racing, she thanked Chen for hiscandor and expressed a desire to visit China tosee in person what he had built, and also tofmally meet him face-to-face. Chen welcomedher planned visit and offered his sympathy forthe pressure she must be feeling from Wall Street.“Mia, I love what I’m doing, and I hope we canwork things out. I really want to stay on when mycontract expires in a few months,” he said.After ending the video conference, Fosterreviewed the exchange with White. The conversation had raised some big issues that needed toYear EndingOctober 31, 2010$ 3,261,5981,663,415382,720782,7842,828,9196,523163,08065,232391,3923,455,145-193,54705,925-199,472-55,852-143,620be resolved: What strategy should Levendaryadopt to drive its expansion in China? Whoshould have responsibility to make and implement those decisions? And what changes, ifany, should be made in the roles, responsibilities,and relationships that linked China’s management team to the home office? Acknowledgingthe importance of these issues, White agreed itwas vital for Foster to get closer to the Chinabusiness. A visit was set for May.Meeting Three: Deciding the FutureOn May 25, as her plane landed at Shanghai’sPudong International Airport, Foster felt a mix ofexcitement and concern. She was thrilled to fmallyvisit this market that held such great potential for theLevendary brand and for her new role as CEO. Butshe was also grappling with some nagging doubtsabout whether Chen was right person for the job.An old mentor had once told Foster thatthere were three types of managers in a newBuilding New Management Capabilitiesbusiness’s evolution to greater scale: the gogetter, the local baron, and the professionalmanager. All three types could be entrepreneurial in spirit, but not all were equally wellsuited for the various stages of a business’sgrowth. Chen was clearly a go-getter whohad evolved to become a local baron. Thequestion in Foster’s mind was whether hecould transition to become a professionalmanager.Two hours later, Mia Foster got out of thelimousine that Louis Chen had arranged to pickher up at the airport. As she strode toward theentrance of Levendary’s Shanghai office, she feltconfident and prepared. Foster was ready for thisconversation.